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Abstract
We consider a multimarket framework where a set of ﬁrms compete on two interrelated oligopolis-
tic markets. Prior to competing in these markets, ﬁrms can spy on others in order to increase
the quality of their product. We characterize the equilibrium espionage networks and networks
that maximize social welfare under the most interesting scenario of diseconomies of scope. We
ﬁnd that in some situations ﬁrms may refrain from spying even if it is costless. Moreover, even
though spying leads to increased product quality, there exist situations where it is detrimental
to both consumer welfare and social welfare.
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11 Introduction
Firms routinely collect and make use of business information about their rivals. With increas-
ing competition at the global level, competitive intelligence gathering activities have become
even more important. Competitive intelligence is the name given to the systematic and ethical
approach for gathering, analyzing and managing information that can aﬀect a ﬁrm’s plans, deci-
sions and operations. In 2002 for instance, Business Week reported that 90% of large companies
have competitive intelligence staﬀ, and many large US ﬁrms spend more than $1 million annually
on competitive intelligence. Moreover, several major multinational ﬁrms like GM, Kodak and
BP have their own separate competitive intelligence units.
Of course ﬁrms also spy on each through more nefarious means. For instance the American
Society of Industrial Security (ASIS) released a survey stating that economic espionage grew by
323% between 1992 and 1996.5 In fact realizing the enormity of this problem, in 1996 the US
Congress passed the Economic Espionage Act, and by 2005 the US Department of Justice was
engaged in prosecuting 45 cases under this act. There are also instances where the distinction
between legal and illegal intelligence gathering activities is blurred. Crane (2005, [5]) is an
interesting study of three cases that virtually cross the realm of competitive intelligence to being
illegal. Probably the most notorious case listed in this study is Proctor and Gamble’s attempt
to ﬁnd out more about Unilever’s hair care business by hunting through their garbage bins. In
fact numerous such tales about business spooks and their sordid activities can be found in the
popular press demonstrating that ﬁrms attempt to access information about their competitors
by hook or by crook.
Our reading of the literature in this area as well as the popular press suggests a number of
stylized facts which we use in this paper. First, corporate espionage whether legal or illegal is
5Economic espionage is a broader term that includes, theft of proprietary information by ﬁrms,
individuals or nations. The ASIS regularly carries out surveys and publishes the value of estimated loss
to American businesses due to economic espionage. For a legal perspective on this and other related
aspects of this topic see Nasheri (2005, [9]). The references listed therein also provide a wealth of
information about all aspects of corporate espionage.
2an issue of growing concern. Second, such activities are more likely in high-tech ﬁrms, the drug
industry and the defense related sector. Typically it is also the case that such ﬁrms are involved
in producing more than one product often with inter-related costs. Third, ﬁrms are aware that
their competitors are attempting to obtain information about them and often take a variety of
actions to curb it. Finally, despite protective measures, rival ﬁrms are often able to engage in
successful spying.
Our paper focuses on the pattern of corporate espionage links between competitors in multi-
market oligopolies and on the impact of these architectures on ﬁrms behavior.6 We use networks
as a tool to visualize the architectures of the spying relationships between ﬁrms and to etablish
our results in a succint manner, i.e., the same qualitative results can also be obtained without
using networks. We model corporate espionage as a two stage game and examine the interaction
between spying activities and multimarket competition. In the ﬁrst stage ﬁrms decide how much
intelligence to gather. More precisely in stage 1 ﬁrms establish (directed) links with other ﬁrms
which provides them information about these ﬁrms resulting in quality improvements.7 Note
that in the examples listed above spying allows a ﬁrm to learn about its rivals product, process
or marketing activities. Spying of this type can be modeled in the simplest way by allowing for
an increase in the ﬁrm’s market share. In our model this occurs more indirectly by allowing
ﬁrms that spy to improve the quality of their product.
Link formation is costly capturing the fact that corporate espionage is a costly activity. In the
second stage, ﬁrms play a Cournot game. Each ﬁrm in the model produces two diﬀerent products
with inter-related costs and is engaged in Cournot competition in two markets simultaneously.
For much of the paper we focus on the more interesting case and assume that the cost function
6The paper does not explore how spying aﬀects R&D in multi-market oligopolies. In the current
paper we identify the amount of spying that will occur in a multi-market setting as well as its impact on
ﬁrm proﬁts and social welfare. To capture its implications on R&D, we need a three-stage model where
the R&D decision is explicitly built in. Our paper is the ﬁrst step in this direction and future research
can examine implications for R&D.
7In our formulation ﬁrms are always successful in their spying eﬀorts. Future work could relax this
assumption by allowing links to succeed only with a positive probability.
3exhibits diseconomies of scope. Later in the paper we discuss the consequences of economies of
scope.
To obtain insights about the role of information gathering when there are diseconomies of
scope across markets, we begin by assuming that all ﬁrms engage in espionage in one market only.
After solving for the Cournot equilibrium in the second stage, we look for the Nash equilibrium
of the link formation, or intelligence gathering game. Clearly Nash equilibrium is the appropriate
concept for this stage since espionage activities do not require mutual consent implicit in Jackson
and Wolinsky’s notion of pairwise stability (1996, [8]).
We begin by characterizing the equilibrium networks that emerge when ﬁrms have the op-
portunity to spy on their competitors. We show that only certain types of networks, namely
the complete network, the empty network and the k-all-or-nothing-networks can be equilibrium
networks.8 We also characterize the networks that maximize social welfare and show that al-
though the architectures of eﬃcient networks are similar to the equilibrium networks, the two
do not always coincide. This provides a clear and nuanced rationale for public policy to regulate
corporate intelligence gathering activities. Since diﬀerent parameter ranges support diﬀerent
architectures as being socially optimal, the policy maker has to be aware of industry parameters
before regulating the amount of espionage in a particular industry. This observation is still valid
when ﬁrms spy on multiple markets simultaneoulsy.
The paper also provides a number of other interesting insights. We show that spying activities
do not always depend on the costs of these activities. Indeed, in some situations, ﬁrms will refrain
from engaging in spying even if the costs of these activities are very low. Moreover, even though
spying leads to improvements in product quality, there exist situations where these activities are
detrimental to consumers as well as social welfare. Lastly, it is interesting to observe that in
some situations competitors may indeed wish to be spied upon. In other words in multimarket
competition, we may expect to observe situations where ﬁrms do not try to prevent competitors
from doing intelligence gathering directed at them.
8The k-all-or-nothing-networks are networks where k ﬁrms have formed a link with all ﬁrms while
the others have not formed any link.
4Next, the extension of espionage activities to both markets leads to an increase in the number
of possible equilibrium conﬁgurations without altering the above observations. Finally, unlike
the previous case in the presence of economies of scope, ﬁrms do not face quantity trade-oﬀs
across the two markets. Therefore, in this case multimarket competition leads to the same
qualitative outcome as competition in a single market.
Our paper intersects several existing literatures. It is related to the network formation
models in an oligopolistic setting found in the work of Goyal and Joshi (GJ, 2003, [6]), and
Billand and Bravard (BB, 2004, [2]). In GJ ﬁrms engage in link formation (requiring mutual
consent) for R&D purposes. Of course these links are undirected and both ﬁrms involved in a
link obtain resources from each other while incurring some costs. In the model of BB, as in this
paper, link formation and resource ﬂow are directed in nature and only the ﬁrm establishing the
link incurs costs. Unlike our paper in both these formulations, link formation is cost reducing
instead of quality enhancing. More importantly however, ﬁrms compete only on one market and
this diﬀerence in formulation alters the results signiﬁcantly in our model. In particular in BB,
the complete network is the unique equilibrium and eﬃcient network when the cost of forming
links is zero. By contrast, in our model, there are cases where even with zero link costs the
empty network is the only equilibrium network. Moreover, the complete network is not the only
eﬃcient network anymore.
Our paper is also related to the theory of multimarket competition, in particular to the work
of Bulow, Geanakoplos, and Klemperer (1985, [4]) on multimarket oligopolies. These authors
examine how a change in one market can have ramiﬁcations on a second market, even if demands
in the two markets are unrelated. In the Bulow et al. (1985, [4]) model changes are exogenous.
By contrast, in our model while costs are inter-related changes in quality are endogenous and
depend on the choices ﬁrms make regarding their espionage activities. The paper also provides
an interesting comparison with the traditional literature on multimarket competition where the
focus is on mutual forbearance (see for instance Bernheim and Whinston, 1990, [1]). In our
model, with diseconomies of scope we ﬁnd that for certain parameters ranges ﬁrms may choose
to spy on their rivals only on one market. This leads to a situation where every ﬁrm improves
5its quality and behaves aggressively on one market only allowing its competitors to do the same
on the other market. This seemingly collusive behavior arises in equilibrium.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The model setup is presented in Section 2.
In Section 3 we provide a characterization of equilibrium networks and Section 4 analyzes the
eﬃcient networks. Section 5 explores the implications of allowing ﬁrms to form links on both
markets. In Section 6 we discuss how the introduction of economies of scope across markets can
aﬀect the results and Section 7 concludes.
2 The Model
In this section we introduce basic network concepts and describe the Cournot game played by
the N ﬁrms in our setting.
2.1 Network Preliminaries
Let N = {1,...,n}, with n ≥ 3, denote a set of ex ante identical ﬁrms. Each ﬁrm produces two
products, and is simultaneously engaged in Cournot competition with all the other ﬁrms in both
markets. We assume that each ﬁrm i ∈ N can form links with the other ﬁrms before competing
in both markets. For any i,j ∈ N, gi,j = 1 implies that ﬁrm i has a directed link with ﬁrm j,
while gi,j = 0 denotes the absence of such a link. We denote the directed links vector of ﬁrm i
by gi = (gi,1,...,gi,i−1,0,gi,i+1, ...,gi,n). We interpret the link from ﬁrm i to ﬁrm j as spying
activity (or intelligence gathering) of i directed at j. A directed network g = {(gi,j)i∈N,j∈N} is
a formal description of the spying activities that exist between the ﬁrms. Let G denote the set of
all possible directed networks. Let Ni(g) = {j ∈ N|gi,j = 1} be the set of ﬁrms j about whom
i gathers information. Its cardinality is given by ni(g). We denote by n−i(g) =
 
j =i nj(g) the
number of links in the network excluding the links originating from ﬁrm i.
We now deﬁne the network architectures that are important for our analysis. In the complete
network for every pair of ﬁrms i and j there is a link from i and j. A network g is empty if no
ﬁrm has formed links. Finally, a network is a k-all-or-nothing-network if k ﬁrms have formed
6links with all other ﬁrms, while the remaining n − k ﬁrms have formed no links.
2.2 Links Formation and the Cournot Game
We consider two oligopoly markets labelled market 1 and market 2. Let qi be the quantity
produced by ﬁrm i on market 1 and Qi be the quantity produced by ﬁrm i on market 2. Let
q = (q1,...,qi,...,qn) and Q = (Q1,...,Qi,...,Qn) be the vectors of quantities produced by
the n ﬁrms on market 1 and on market 2 respectively. Demand is assumed to be independent
across markets.
We assume that consumers are identical and have the following quasi-linear aggregate utility
function:9














































i=1 PiQi + I ≤ R, where R denotes income, pi and Pi denote the prices set by
ﬁrm i, on market 1 and on market 2 respectively.
Note that equation (1) is a quality augmented version of the standard quadratic utility
function introduced by Vives (2000, [10]), when there are two independent markets and products
are vertically diﬀerentiated. Thus, αi and βi represent the quality of the products sold by ﬁrm i
on market 1 and market 2 respectively. This utility function implies that consumers spend only
a small part of their income on the two products ensuring that an interior solution exists.
In the two stage game played by the ﬁrms, stage 1 involves intelligence gathering through
link formation and stage 2 is quantity competition. For the time being in stage 1 we assume that
9The model structure is deliberately kept simplistic to keep the algebra tractable and also to obtain
the precise spying architectures. More general formulations can only be done at the cost of these.
7ﬁrms can form links only on the ﬁrst market.10 A link represents gathering information about
competitors’ products and costs f > 0. This in turn allows the ﬁrm gathering the information
to increase the quality of its product to be sold on market 1. Observe that ex ante ﬁrms are
symmetric in market 1. Consequently, ﬁrm i’s product quality is only a function of the number
of ﬁrms with whom i has formed a link or spies on. More speciﬁcally, in the remainder of the
paper, we assume the following speciﬁc form for the product quality function:11
αi = γ0 + γni(g).
Further, as in BKG (1985, [4], pg. 490-491) in our model costs of ﬁrms are interrelated across





Thus, the cost incurred by ﬁrm i depends on the quantities produced in both markets and there
are joint diseconomies across markets. The impact of economies of scope is discussed in Section
5.
3 Equilibrium under Espionage
















10This is enough for obtaining the key insights. However in Section 4 we relax this assumption and
examine how our results are aﬀected if ﬁrms can spy on both markets.
11This is a natural adaptation of the marginal cost formulation used by Bloch (1995, [3]) or Goyal
and Joshi ( 2003, [6]) to the quality production function. It is worth noting that this formulation does
not introduce transitivity in the infomation obtained by ﬁrms.
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From the ﬁrst order conditions the equilibrium quantities produced by each ﬁrm i ∈ N in the
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We assume that the parameters γ0, γ, β take values which ensure that the quantities are positive.
The stage 1 proﬁt function can now be rewritten as:
Π∗









j =i nj(g) + Ψ − ni(g)f,
(3)







in its ﬁrst argument and increasing in its second argument. We now characterize equilibrium
espionage networks in this setting. Let Π∗
i(ni(g),n−i(g)) be the equilibrium proﬁt of ﬁrm i ∈ N
in the network g.










It follows that ﬁrm i forms an additional espionage link only if it allows i for strictly greater
proﬁts. We now provide a complete characterization of the architecture of equilibrium networks.
We start by noting a convexity property of the ﬁrm’s proﬁts with respect to the number of links
it establishes, then we state a proposition that uses this property.
12The values of these parameters are given in Appendix A.
9Lemma 1 Let the payoﬀ function satisfy (3). In an equilibrium network g, ﬁrms will establish
either 0 links or n − 1 links.
Proof To prove the lemma, let Π∗
i(ni(g)) = Π∗
i(ni(g), ˆ n−i(g)) where ˆ n−i(g) is a ﬁxed vector.
Now we compare Π∗
i(ni(g) + 1) with Π∗
i(ni(g)).
Π∗
i(ni(g) + 1) − Π∗
i(ni(g)) = (2ni(g) + 1)Λ + Φ
 
j =i
nj(g) + Ω − f.
If ni(g) ≥
 
−Ω − Λ − Φ
 




i(ni(g)) ≥ 0 and the func-
tion increases with ni(g). If ni(g) ≤
 
−Ω − Λ + Φ
 
j =i nj(g) + f
 
/2Λ, then Π∗
i(ni(g) + 1) −
Π∗
i(ni(g)) ≤ 0 and the function decreases with ni(g). It follows that there are two cases:
1. If f ≤ Ω + Λ − Φ
 
j =i nj(g), then proﬁt increases with ni(g) and ﬁrm i will establish
(n − 1) links.
2. If f > Ω + Λ − Φ
 
j =i nj(g), then there exists x such that the function decreases for
ni(g) ≤ x and increases for ni(g) > x. Therefore, proﬁts are maximized either at ni(g) = 0
or ni(g) = n − 1.
￿
Proposition 1 Let the payoﬀ function satisfy (3).
1. If for all i ∈ N, f ≤ Λ(n − 1) + Ωi + Φ(n − 1)2, then the complete network is the unique
equilibrium espionage network;
2. If for all i ∈ N, f ∈ (Λ(n − 1) + Ωi,Λ(n − 1) + Ωi + Φ(n − 1)2), then an equilibrium
espionage network is a k-all-or-nothing-network;
3. If for all i ∈ N, f ≥ Λ(n − 1) + Ωi, then the empty network is the unique equilibrium
espionage network.
Proof See Appendix. ￿
Few remarks are in order here.
10Remark 1. In equilibrium intelligence activities can lead to asymmetric espionage networks
among ex ante symmetric ﬁrms. Note that for a range of parameters, asymmetric networks
where some ﬁrms have n−1 links and other ﬁrms have no links at all, are equilibrium networks.
In fact, Proposition 1 is true even if βi = β for all i ∈ N, that is if ﬁrms are ex ante identical.
Hence this result illustrates how intelligence activities can generate substantial asymmetries
among ﬁrms with regard to the quality of their products and proﬁts.
Remark 2. Higher quality product in market 2 results in trade-oﬀ with intelligence gathering.
The intuition for this result is as follows. It is easily checked that the price-elasticity of demand
for the product sold by ﬁrm i in market 2 is increasing in the quality of its product, βi. In this
framework when ﬁrm i establishes an additional link in market 1, it has an incentive to increase
the quantity produced on the ﬁrst market (“output eﬀect”) and due to diseconomies of scope
across markets, decrease the quantity of its product sold on the second market (“cost eﬀect”).
A higher βi implies a greater loss of revenue resulting from the decrease in Qi.
Remark 3. In equilibrium, ﬁrms selling the higher quality goods in market 2 may be the ones
that engage in intelligence gathering. Even if ceteris paribus the better quality sold by a ﬁrm on
market 2 lowers the incentive for this ﬁrm to establish links (Remark 2), it is not necessarily the
ﬁrms with the lowest quality products on market 2 that will do so. This counterintuitive result
can be explained as follows. Recall that when the number of ﬁrms who have formed n − 1 links
increases, the marginal payoﬀ of a ﬁrm from spying decreases. In some situations, where this
(latter) negative eﬀect outweighs the positive eﬀect resulting from diﬀerences in product quality
on market 2, we can observe equilibrium networks where only the ﬁrms with higher quality
products on market 2 have formed links. The following example illustrates this situation.
Example 1 Assume n = 10, γ0 = 7, γ = 0.2, βi = 6.1, for ﬁve ﬁrms, βi = 6 for ﬁve other ﬁrms
and f = 0.16. We can check that the network where ﬁrms having the higher product quality in
market 2 have formed n − 1 links on market 1 and the ﬁrms having the lower quality product
on market 2 have formed no links on market 1 is an equilibrium network.
Remark 4. Firms may have an incentive to be spied upon. It is interesting to note that in
11some situations ﬁrms do not have an incentive to protect themselves from spying by competitors,
as the following example illustrates.
Example 2 Assume n = 3, γ0 = 7, γ = 0.5, βi = 22, for all i = 1,2,3, and f = 0. Consider a
network g where two ﬁrms have formed 2 links each and one ﬁrm has formed no links. We can
check that if the latter ﬁrm forms links, the proﬁts of her competitors increase.
The intuition of this result stems from the interplay between the “output eﬀect” and the
“cost eﬀect”. The example shows that when the “cost eﬀect” (which increases proﬁts) dominates
the “output eﬀect” (which decreases proﬁts) ﬁrms have an incentive to be spied upon. Although
this result seems relatively strange, we ﬁnd such behavior in a case study about US minimill steel
producers (von Hippel, 1987, [7]). We now establish that, under some conditions, the complete
network is not an equilibrium espionage network when the cost of spying is zero.
Corollary 1 Suppose the payoﬀ function satisﬁes (3) and the cost of forming links is zero.
Then, there exist parameters, γ, γ0, (βi)i∈N, such that the empty network, and the k-all-or-
nothing-networks are equilibrium espionage networks.
Proof The proof is straightforward and is omitted. ￿
This result suggests that even if there are no costs of spying, due to the two eﬀects mentioned
above there are instances when ﬁrms have no incentive to gather information about other ﬁrms,
i.e., the set of equilibrium espionage networks does not include the complete network. Note
that this result diﬀers from rest of networks literature where zero link costs always lead to the
complete network in equilibrium. This is also true when espionage occurs in the absence of
spillovers across markets as in BB (Proposition 1, pg. 598).
4 Welfare under Espionage
In this section we identify diﬀerent types of eﬃcient espionage networks when ﬁrms are involved
in intelligence gathering. For a network g, aggregate welfare W(g) is deﬁned as the sum of
12consumers’ surplus and ﬁrms’ aggregate proﬁts.
We deﬁne a network g as eﬃcient if W(g) ≥ W(g′) for all g′ ∈ G. Moreover, we say that a
network g is eﬃcient for ﬁrms (consumers) if this network maximizes the aggregate proﬁts of
ﬁrms (surplus of consumers).
4.1 Consumer Welfare
In this section, we show that the total surplus of consumers is maximized either for the complete
network or for the empty network. We begin by showing that consumers’ welfare does not
depend on the number of links established by speciﬁc ﬁrms. In other words consumers surplus
does not depend on intelligence gathering activities of speciﬁc ﬁrms but on the total amount of
spying that takes place in the industry.
Lemma 2 Suppose that the utility function satisﬁes (1) and the quantities produced satisfy (2).
The total surplus of consumers depends on the total amount of spying in the industry and not
on the distribution of the spying activity.






















i=1 βi + nγ0 (2 + n)








i=1 ni(g) + (2 + n)
 n
i=1 βi − nγ0







i(g) depend only on the total number of links, the total surplus of
consumers does not depend on the pattern of spying activity; it depends only on the aggregate
spying level. ￿
13Proposition 2 Suppose that the utility function satisﬁes (1) and the quantities produced satisfy
(2). The eﬃcient espionage network for consumers is either the empty network or the complete
network.
Proof Let SC(T) denote the the total surplus of consumers in a network g, where the total
number of links formed by the ﬁrms is
 n
i=1 ni(g) = T. We have:





n2 + 4n + 5
(n2 + 4n + 3)2
 
> 0
Observe that the total surplus of consumers exhibits increasing returns with respect to the
number of links formed by ﬁrms. Hence the eﬃcient network for consumers is either the empty
network or the complete network, depending on the sign of the expression SC((n−1)2)−SC(0).
￿
Note that consumers may be negatively aﬀected by corporate espionage even if it leads to
an increase in product quality in market 1. This can be explained in the following way. Link
formation in market 1 has two opposite eﬀects on consumers welfare. First, ﬁrms oﬀer a better
quality product in market 1 and as a whole have an incentive to sell more in this market. This
behavior is clearly beneﬁcial to consumers. Second, due to diseconomies of scope, as ﬁrms sell
more in market 1, they have an incentive to sell less in market 2. This leads to higher prices in
market 2 and is harmful for consumers. The above proposition establishes that this latter eﬀect
may outweigh the gains from the higher quality in market 1.
4.2 Social Welfare
In this section, we examine the proﬁts of ﬁrms as well as total welfare.
Lemma 3 Let the payoﬀ function satisfy (3).
1. There are at least n − 1 ﬁrms which have formed either 0 or n − 1 links in an eﬃcient
espionage network for ﬁrms.
2. There are at least n − 1 ﬁrms which have formed either 0 or n − 1 links in an eﬃcient
espionage network.
14Proof See appendix. ￿
Proposition 3 Let the payoﬀ function satisfy (3).
1. A network g is an eﬃcient espionage network for ﬁrms if it is the empty network, the
complete network, or a k-all-or-nothing network.
2. A network g is an eﬃcient espionage network if it is the empty network, the complete
network, or a k-all-or-nothing network.
Proof See Appendix. ￿
Our analysis shows that as with equilibrium networks, only three architectures can arise
here: the empty network, the complete network, and the k-all-or-nothing networks.
Remark 5. Conﬂict between between Nash and eﬃcient espionage networks, and policy
implication. While eﬃcient espionage networks and Nash networks have the same architectures
they do not always coincide. Below is a simple example where such a conﬂict between eﬃciency
and equilibrium exists.
Example 3 Assume n = 3, γ0 = 20, γ = 2, βi = 22, for all i = 1,2,3, and f = 6.
It can be checked that the complete network is an equilibrium espionage network, but not an
eﬃcient espionage network. For instance, the network where 2 ﬁrms have established 2 links each
and one ﬁrm has no links is more eﬃcient than the complete network. Thus, equilibrium espi-
onage networks can be over-connected with respect to social welfare leading to over-investment
in spying activities in equilibrium. This provides a strong argument for policy intervention with
regard to business related espionage, as the US Industrial Espionage Act of 1996.
5 Intelligence Gathering in Both Markets
We now extend our basic model by allowing ﬁrms to engage in espionage activities in both
markets. While the basic insights remain the same, we show that the possible range of equilib-
15rium espionage networks increases dramatically since the two markets allow for a richer set of
outcomes.13
In the following we denote by niℓ(g) the number of links formed by ﬁrm i on market ℓ, where
ℓ = 1,2. We assume that the qualities of the products sold by ﬁrm i on market 1, αi, and on
market 2, βi, depend on the number of links established, or the amount of intelligence gathered
by the ﬁrm in each market in the following way:
αi = α0 + αni1(g).
βi = β0 + βni2(g).





j =i Qj)) = (αi − q)qi + (βi − Q)Qi − 1
2(qi + Qi)2 , (4)
where q = qi +
 
j =i qj and Q = Qi +
 
j =i Qj.
Since equilibrium quantities ultimately depend on the number of links in stage 1 of the game,






Lemma 4 Let the payoﬀ function satisfy (4). In an equilibrium espionage network g, ﬁrms
form either zero or n − 1 links.
Proof Let ∆Π∗
il(g) denote the marginal payoﬀ of a ﬁrm i from forming an additional link in
market ℓ. Using the same arguments as in Section 2 and with straightforward computations, we
ﬁnd that for a given network g, ∆Π∗
il(g) is increasing in niℓ(g). Consequently, in equilibrium,
each ﬁrm either forms no links or n − 1 links on each market. ￿
Observe that the above lemma allows for a large number of possible equilibrium architectures.
To present results in a succinct manner we deﬁne some additional notations. Let nA be the
number of ﬁrms who form 0 links in both markets. Let nB be the number of ﬁrms who form 0
links in market 1 and n − 1 links in market 2. Let nC be the number of ﬁrms who form n − 1
13Here we only provide the main results and a sketch of the proofs. Detailed results and proofs are
available from the authors on request.
16links in market 1 and 0 links in market 2. Let nD be the number of ﬁrms who form n − 1 links
in both markets.
Just as in the case of link formation in one market, here we can identify parameters Γ1, Γ2,
Γ3, T, ω0, τ0,   ω and   τ (with   ω > ω0 and   τ > τ0 and Γ1, Γ2, Γ3, T > 0) such that we get the
following result.14
Proposition 4 Let the payoﬀ function satisfy (4).
1. If f ≤ min[ω0,τ0] −
αβ(Γ1 + Γ3)(n − 1)
T
= Σ1, then the complete network is the unique
equilibrium espionage network.




2] = Σ2, then the empty network is
the unique equilibrium espionage network.
3. A network g, where some ﬁrms spy on all other ﬁrms in both markets while other ﬁrms
do not spy at all, (namely nA > 0 and nD > 0 simultaneously) cannot be an equilibrium
espionage network.
4. If f ∈ (Σ1,Σ2), then an equilibrium espionage network is characterized by some combina-
tion of nA,nB,nC,nD with 0 6 ni 6 n (i = A,B,C,D) such that we do not have nA > 0
and nD > 0 simultaneously.
The table in Appendix C furnishes suﬃcient conditions for a certain network to be an
equilibrium network. Namely, if the parameters in question lie in the relevant range in the
left column, an equilibrium described by the right column exists provided of course that the
parameters values are such that the range is a non-empty interval.
To give some insights into the proof of Proposition 4, it works in the same way as the proof
of Proposition 1. Namely, given that a ﬁrm can either form 0 or n − 1 links in equilibrium, we
compare the proﬁts in these two scenarios and identify conditions in which one is weakly greater
than the other.
14The values of these parameters are given in Appendix D.
17The possibility of equilibrium espionage networks where some ﬁrms have formed n−1 links
on market 1 and no links on market 2, while other ﬁrms have formed no links on market 1 and
n − 1 links on market 2 can be easily explained. Indeed, straightforward calculations show that
the marginal payoﬀ of ﬁrm i, ∆Π∗
il(g), satisﬁes the three following properties.
Property 1: ∆Π∗
i1(g) is decreasing in βi, and hence in ni2(g). Similarly, ∆Π∗
i2(g) is decreasing
in αi, and hence in ni1(g). Consequently, each link formed in one of the two markets
reduces the marginal proﬁtability of a link formed in the other market.
Property 2: ∆Π∗
i1(g) is decreasing in αj where j  = i and hence in nj1(g). Similarly, ∆Π∗
i2(g)
is decreasing in βj where j  = i and hence in nj2(g).
Property 3: ∆Π∗
i1(g) is increasing in βj where j  = i and hence in nj2(g). Similarly, ∆Π∗
i2(g)
is increasing in αj where j  = i and hence in nj1(g).
Properties 2 and 3 mean that the marginal payoﬀ of a ﬁrm in a particular market decreases
when other ﬁrms step up intelligence activities in that market, but increases when they increase
the level of such activities in the other market.
Note that it is more diﬃcult to explain why the networks with ﬁrms that have formed n−1
links on both markets and ﬁrms that have formed no links on both markets cannot be equilibrium
espionage network. Indeed in such networks the three properties have opposing eﬀects. However,
it is interesting to note that the diﬀerence of marginal proﬁts from forming n − 1 links on one
market, between a ﬁrm, say i, which has already formed links on both markets and a ﬁrm, say
j, which has formed no links at all, can be split into three terms. Each of these terms assesses
the diﬀerence of strength of the eﬀect associated with one property. As expected, property 1 as
well as property 3 work in favor of marginal proﬁts of ﬁrm j while property 2 works in favor
of marginal proﬁts of ﬁrm i. Moreover through tedious algebra it can be checked that the total
eﬀect of properties 1 and 3 always outweighs the eﬀect of property 2. This explains the result.
Further it is also worth noting that in some equilibria we get a kind of mutual forbearance result
involving no spying in both markets.
Next, we focus on the aspect that is most important from a policy perspective: the conﬂict
18between eﬃciency and equilibrium. This conﬂict continues to be present when we introduce the
possibility of ﬁrms spying in both markets. In particular, the following example illustrates how
ﬁrms can over-invest in spying links with regard to social welfare.
Example 4 This is similar to Example 3 and exploits continuity by making β suﬃciently small.
Assume n = 3, α0 = 20, α = 2, β0 = 22, β = 0.000001 and f = 6. The network in which all
ﬁrms form two links in market 1 and no links in market 2 is an equilibrium but not eﬃcient
network. Indeed the network in which two ﬁrms form two links each and the remaining ﬁrm
forms no links in market 1, and no ﬁrm forms any links in market 2 is more eﬃcient than the
earlier network.
6 Economies of Scope versus Diseconomies of Scope
We now explain what happens when the cost function exhibits economies of scope. We show
that in this case there is no tension across markets anymore and ﬁrms have always an incentive
to form links and spy, provided these costs of spying are low enough. For simplicity we assume
that ﬁrms spy in only one market, though as before the insights can be generalized to allow for




































i is equilibrium proﬁt, and q∗
j,Q∗
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Since the three terms in the above expression have a positive sign, ﬁrms have always an incentive
to spy in order to increase the quality of their products. The intuition behind this result is as
follows: when ﬁrm i forms a link and increases the quality of its product on a market, then
it adopts a more aggressive strategy not only on this market but on the other market too due
to economies of scope. Since competitors regard their product as a strategic substitute for the
products of ﬁrm i on each market, they sell less on both markets and this behavior is beneﬁcial
to ﬁrm i. Hence the complete network is the only possible equilibrium espionage network with
19zero costs of spying. When costs of spying are positive, then the equilibrium architecture is
dependent only on the value of f and not on the spillovers across markets, making economies of
scope rather uninteresting in the multimarket context.
It is also important to note that the introduction of economies of scope across markets does
not put an end to the conﬂict between equilibrium espionage networks and total welfare. More
precisely, the following example shows that there exist situations where ﬁrms may over-invest in
espionage with respect to social welfare.
Example 5 Suppose that the cost function of all ﬁrms i = 1,...,n is given by:




The cost incurred by ﬁrm i depends on the quantities produced in both markets and there are
joint economies across markets. In this example we let γ take diﬀerent values in market 1 and
market 2 denoted by α1 and β1 respectively. Assume n = 3, α0 = 3, α1 = 1, β0 = 10, β1 = 0.1,
and f = 0.6177. It can be checked that the situation where all ﬁrms have established two links
on market 1 and no links on market 2 is an equilibrium network, whereas social welfare increases
if one of the ﬁrms deletes its links.
Conclusion
In this paper we study the incentives of ﬁrms to spy on other ﬁrms in order to increase the
quality of their products, in a multimarket setting where competitors regard their products as
strategic substitutes. A signiﬁcant ﬁnding is that under diseconomies of scope ﬁrms may have
no incentive to spy even if the cost of intelligence activities is zero. Moreover, in some situations
ﬁrms might even prefer other ﬁrms to spy on them. We ﬁnd that although intelligence activities
lead to increased quality products, they may lead to a reduction of social welfare as well as
consumers welfare. Furthermore, in some cases equilibrium level of spying by ﬁrms can exceed
the socially optimal level, making a strong case for regulatory intervention.
Our paper is the ﬁrst formal analysis of competitive intelligence type activities which are
becoming increasingly important in modern economies. We brieﬂy discuss some issues that could
20be explored in future work. First we take up the issue of spying activities. In our model spy-
ing is always successful. However in future work spying need only be successful with a certain
probability. Another extension would be to introduce a spatial dimension where the identity of
the ﬁrms being spied upon would matter. The second issue is the impact of spying activities.
An important question would be to examine the consequences of spying for future product de-
velopment and its impact on social welfare. It might also be interesting to examine the impact
of spying activities when ﬁrms play a price game. Third, from a network perspective we need to
examine multimarket competition with inter-related costs where ﬁrms make collaborative R&D
decisions. In this case it would be necessary to modify the equilibrium concept to allow for
consent. This would enable us to consider other stability notions like pairwise stability.
Appendix A: Values of proﬁt parameters
We give the values of Λ,Φ,Ω which play an important role in the marginal payoﬀ from links.
Let d = (18(n2 + 4n + 3)2)−1. We have:
Λ = dγ2(11n4 + 66n3 + 107n2 + 24n + 8),














7n2 + 18n − 1
  
j =i βj)
21We now give the values of other parameters.
Ψ = d(nγ0(6
 
j =i βj(n + 14) − 6βi(10n + n2 + 17) + 9γ0(10 + 3n))
−βi
 
j =i βj(124n2 + 22n3 + 182n+ 8) + γ0(99γ0 + 150
 
j =i βj)
+βi(nβi(3 + n)(11n2 + 33n + 8) + 8βi − 8
 
j =i βj + 24γ0)
+n(
 
j =i βj)2(58 + 11n)).
Γ = 2dγ(γ0(n − 1)(11n2 + 58n + 83) + βi(n + 4)(7n2 + 18n − 1)
−(7n2 + 50n + 79)(
 
j =i βj)).
∆ = d(γ2(11n2 + 58n + 83))
Appendix B: Proofs.
Proof of Proposition 1 By Lemma 1 ﬁrm i either forms 0 links or n−1 links in an equilibrium
espionage network. We compare the proﬁts of ﬁrm i in these two cases. Let ˆ n−i(g) be a ﬁxed
number of links formed by all the other ﬁrms. The network g where i forms n − 1 links is an
equilibrium espionage network if for all ﬁrms i:
Π∗
i(n − 1, ˆ n−i(g)) − Π∗
i(0, ˆ n−i(g)) ≥ 0,
that is:
Λ(n − 1)2 + Ωi(n − 1) + Φ(n − 1)
 
j =i
nj(g) − f(n − 1) ≥ 0. (5)
(1) We now prove the ﬁrst part of the proposition. The complete network is an equilibrium
espionage network if inequality (5) is veriﬁed for nj = n − 1 for all j  = i, that is
 
j =i nj(g) =
(n − 1)2. Therefore, the complete network is an equilibrium espionage network if for all ﬁrms i
f ≤ Λ(n − 1) + Ωi + Φ(n − 1)
2.
Next we show that under this condition, a network where at least one ﬁrm has set zero links is not
an equilibrium espionage network. Assume an equilibrium network g where k ﬁrms belonging
to K ⊂ N have formed no links and f ≤ Λ(n − 1) + Ωi + Φ(n − 1)2 for all ﬁrms i.15 Since g is
15Note that K may be a singleton set.
22an equilibrium espionage network, we have for all i ∈ K:
Π∗
i(0, ˆ n−i(g)) − Π∗
i(n − 1, ˆ n−i(g)) ≥ 0,
that is:
Λ(n − 1)2 + Ωi(n − 1) + Φ(n − 1)
 
j =i
nj(g) − f(n − 1) ≤ 0.
Since
 
j =i nj(g) = (n − k)(n − 1), for all i ∈ K we obtain
Λ(n − 1) + Ωi + Φ(n − 1)(n − k) ≤ f.
Hence, for all i ∈ K, f ≤ Λ(n − 1) + Ωi + Φ(n − 1)2 and Λ(n − 1) + Ωi + Φ(n − 1)(n − k) ≤ f.
Since Φ < 0, this gives us the desired contradiction.
(2) We now prove the second part of the proposition. First, the empty network is an equi-
librium espionage network if for all ﬁrms inequality (5) is not veriﬁed for nj = 0 for all j  = i,
or,
f ≥ Λ(n − 1) + Ωi.
Next, we show that under this condition a network where at least one ﬁrm has formed n − 1
links is not an equilibrium espionage network. Again assume an equilibrium network g where k
ﬁrms which belong to K′ ⊂ N have formed n −1 links, and for all i ∈ K′, f ≥ Λ(n− 1) +Ωi.16
Since g is an equilibrium espionage network, we have for all i ∈ K′
Π
∗
i(n − 1, ˆ n−i(g)) − Π
∗
i(0, ˆ n−i(g)) ≥ 0,
that is:
Λ(n − 1)
2 + Ωi(n − 1) + Φ(n − 1)
 
j =i
nj(g) − f(n − 1) ≥ 0
Substituting the fact that
 
j =i nj(g) = (k − 1)(n − 1), we obtain
Λ(n − 1) + Ωi + Φ(n − 1)(k − 1) ≥ f.
Hence, we have f ≥ Λ(n − 1) + Ωi and Λ(n − 1) + Ωi + Φ(n − 1)(k − 1) ≥ f. Since Φ < 0, we
get the desired contradiction.
16Again note that K
′ may be a singleton.
23(3) The third part of the proposition follows in a straightforward manner from the ﬁrst two
parts of the proposition and the Lemma 1.
￿
Proof of Lemma 3.1 Let g be an eﬃcient network for multimarket ﬁrms. Assume there
are two ﬁrms, say i and ℓ, such that ni(g) ∈ {1,...,n−2} and nℓ(g) ∈ {1,...,n−2}. Without
loss of generality let ni(g) ≥ nℓ(g). Let g′ be the network where all ﬁrms except i and ℓ do not
change their links. Suppose ℓ deletes k links and i adds k links giving us: ni(g′) = ni(g) + k
and nℓ(g′) = nℓ(g)−k. We assume that there are x ﬁrms which have formed n−2 links, and so
n − 2 − x ﬁrms have formed no links. The diﬀerence in total proﬁt between g and g′, denoted
by Zm, is
Zm = 2Λk(ni(g) − nℓ(g) + k) + 2Φk(nℓ(g) − ni(g) − k)
+2∆k(ni(g) − nl(g) + k)
= 2k(ni(g) − nℓ(g) + k)(Λ − Φ + ∆).
Since, k > 0, Λ > 0, Φ < 0 and ∆ > 0, we have Zm > 0
Thus, g cannot be eﬃcient for multimarket ﬁrms, giving us a contradiction.
￿
Proof of Lemma 3.2 This lemma is straightforward from Lemma 2 and Lemma 3.1.
￿
Proof of Proposition 3.1 We know by Lemma 3 that a network g is an eﬃcient network
if there is at most one ﬁrm i which has formed ni(g) ∈ {1,...,n − 2} links. We now show that
a network g, where a ﬁrm i has formed ni(g) ∈ {1,...,n−2} links, is not an eﬃcient espionage
network. To introduce a contradiction let us assume an eﬃcient espionage network g where a
ﬁrm, say i, has formed ni(g) ∈ {1,...,n− 2} links and gi,j = 1, gi,k = 0. Let g′ be the network
with the same set of links as in g except that i has not formed a link with j. Let x be the number






i(g′) = Ωi − f + Γ (n − 1) + 2 Φ x (n − 1) + Λ (2 ni(g) − 1)
+(1 + n(−1 − 6 x + 2 ni(g) + 2 n x)
+ 4 x − 2 ni(g))∆
= X > 0.
Let g′′ be the network where all ﬁrms except i have the same links as in g, and i forms the same






i(g) = Ωi − f + Γ (n − 1) + 2 Φ x (n − 1) + Λ (2 ni(g) + 1)
+(n + 4 x − 6 n x − 2 ni(g) + 2 n ni(g)
+2 n2 x − 1
 
∆
= Y < 0.
We now compare X and Y, we get:
X − Y = −2((n − 1)∆ + Λ) < 0.
This gives us the desired contradiction.
￿
Proof of Proposition 3.2 We know by Lemma 4 that there is at most one ﬁrm i which
has formed ni(g)  ∈ {0,n − 1} links in an eﬃcient espionage network. We now show that this
ﬁrm cannot exist in an eﬃcient espionage network.
Denote by f(ni,
 
j =i nj) the proﬁt of a ﬁrm with ni links while the other ﬁrms have
 
j =i nj
links. Consider a network where x ﬁrms have formed n −1 links, n −x−1 ﬁrms have formed 0
links and one ﬁrm, say i, which has formed t links, t ∈ {1,.,n − 2}.
Aggregate proﬁt of all ﬁrms, Π, is given by:
xf(n − 1,(x − 1)(n − 1) + t) + (n − x − 1)f(0,x(n − 1) + t) + f(t,x(n − 1)) = g(t).
Also denote by h(t) the total consumers’ surplus when x(n − 1) + t links have been formed.
Hence, the total surplus is: s(t) = g(t) + h(t). We have
s(t + 1) + s(t − 1) − 2s(t) =
 





25The total gross surplus increases with the number of links ﬁrm i has formed with others.
Therefore, an eﬃcient espionage network cannot contain a ﬁrm which has formed ni(g)  ∈ {0,n−
1} links.
￿
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nB > 0
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αβ   Γ3   (n − 1)
T






nB > 0 and
nC > 0
max(  τ,   ω) −
αβ   Γ3   (n − 1)
T







αβ(Γ1 + Γ3)(n − 1)
T
nB > 0,nC >
0 and nD > 0
  τ −
αβ   Γ3   (n − 1)
T







αβ(Γ1 + Γ3)(n − 1)
T
nC > 0 and
nD > 0
  ω −
αβ   Γ3   (n − 1)
T







αβ(Γ1 + Γ3)(n − 1)
T
nB > 0 and
nD > 0
26Appendix D: Intelligence gathering in both markets
Parameters values in terms of model primitives for Proposition 4. are
T = 18(1 + n)2(3 + n)2, Γ0 =
 




















Γ0 (2   β0 + (n − 1)β) − Γ1   α0 − Γ2   (n     β − β0) + Γ3   (n − 1)α0
 
;
  τ =
β
T





[Γ0 (2   α0 + (n − 1)α) − Γ1   β0 − Γ2(n     α − α0) + Γ3   (n − 1)β0];
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